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ABSTRACT 
Authenticity has been conceived of in several different ways with various 
meanings and implications. The existential conception has the advantage of tracking 
authenticity from the phenomenology of human beings and their lived, social experience. 
From Jean-Paul Sartre and Martin Heidegger’s criteria for existentialist authenticity, I 
develop the argument that authentic, feminist projects are necessarily one mode of being 
authentic within a patriarchal society. In defining a conception of authenticity out of 
Sartre and Heidegger’s terms, the question of what qualifies as an authentic feminist 
project arises as well as the question of what sort of content qualifies as authentic. While 
Simone De Beauvoir does not focus on authenticity in her ethics, she does give a basis 
for a value oriented, content relevant aspect of existentialism generally. Insofar as 
authenticity is an existentialist concept, feminist authenticity is one valuable and 
worthwhile project within a social patriarchy, as it promotes existence as freedom. 
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CHAPTER 1 
                                             INTRODUCTION 
Authenticity has often been thought of as part of a theory of self-hood such as in 
Charles Taylor1 and Corey Anton2. On this sort of view authenticity is thought to apply to 
people who are “true to themselves”. The issue becomes, what is the true self? Various 
conceptions of authenticity have tried to respond to this question. At the end of his book, 
On Being Authentic, Charles Guignon describes a more social function of authentic 
being.3 Guignon’s picture of authenticity involves not merely a theory of the authentic 
self, but a theory of the authentically social self. I propose that an existential conception 
of authenticity is well suited to this social aspect of human beings. My goal is to describe 
one mode of being authentic in current U.S. society. The instance of authenticity that I 
have in mind is socially constituted and bears much of what Guignon seems to value in a 
conception of authenticity. The conception of authenticity that I plan to promote, first, 
does not ignore the social involvement of human beings, and second, adds a morally 
substantive aspect to authenticity which is commonly thought to be missing in the 
existential conceptions put forth by Heidegger and Sartre. Simone De Beauvior has 
envisioned existentialism as being a way for human beings to project value onto the 
world, thereby being the source of value in the world.4  
                                                 
1 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1989) and The Ethics of Authenticity, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1991). 
 
2 Corey Anton, Selfhood and Authenticity, (Albany, State University of New York Press, 2001). 
 
3 Charles Guignon, On Being Authentic, Thinking in Action, (New York, Routledge, 2004). 
 
4 Simone De Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, (Philosophical Library, 1948). 
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Heidegger and Sartre, in Being and Time and Being and Nothingness both focus 
on existentialist being apart from but not necessarily explicitly excluding an entailed 
ethics. De Beauvior on the other hand, recognizes and seeks to address the criticism that 
existentialism as a philosophy leaves no room for ethics. In my own explanation of 
feminist authenticity, I will drawl first from Heidegger and Sartre’s existentialism and 
later develop an argument for the ethical implications of authenticity (specifically 
regarding feminist authenticity).  
 Both Heidegger and Sartre take a phenomenological approach toward a 
conception of authenticity. Heidegger seems to describe authenticity in two different 
contexts: being towards death, and the everydayness of da-sein.5 Sartre’s analysis of 
authenticity is discussed in terms of its negation, namely, bad faith.6 My first move is to 
construct a conception of feminist authenticity from my understandings of both 
Heidegger and Sartre. In doing so, I hope to answer two primary questions in this paper: 
1) How should we describe the inauthentic feminist? 2) Is it possible for one to be an 
authentic oppressor? It is through De Beauvior’s response to existential criticism that we 
will find a response to this later question. Through the culmination of these existentialist 
conceptions, I think that we will find that authentic being is a worthwhile project for all 
human beings; my aim here is to tackle one specific mode of being authentic (feminist 
authenticity), though I think there are many modes of living an authentic life. Whether 
one can achieve a wholly authentic life in all aspects is a question that I will not pursue in 
this project.  
                                                 
5 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (State University of New York Press, 2010). 
 
6 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (Washington Square Press, 1956). 
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 I intend to develop a groundwork for an understanding of feminist authenticity 
not only out of the conceptions of both Heidegger and Sartre, but also with Guignon’s 
critique in mind. Nevertheless, after explicating and extracting the primary ideas of their 
existentialist conceptions, I will draw from further implications and interpretations of 
their thought. I think that existentialist authenticity considering Heidegger, Sartre, and De 
Beauvoir, bears significant weight in terms of human life projects as well as moral 
responsibility for members of any social context. It is my view that an authentic way of 
being in the world can be realized (among other modes of being in the world) through 
feminist being. With this in mind, my project is most relevant to our being in a patriarchal 
world.  
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CHAPTER 2 
GUINGON: THE MEANING OF AUTHENTICTY 
In his book, Guignon takes the reader through a history of authenticity as its 
conception has evolved over time. Conceptions of authenticity were once considered 
from a cosmological perspective where being authentic simply meant knowing one’s 
(given) place in the world. This conception evolved into a more anthropocentric 
interpretation during the period of enlightenment and further evolved into a post-modern 
conception of self-determinism or self-hood. The early view is far removed from the 
existentialist approach since it declares a given place or station to the individual. On this 
cosmological view, an individual is authentic if they have found their place in the natural 
given order of the world. Guignon says of this view,  
To know yourself, then, is to know above all what your place is in the scheme of 
things- what you are and what you should be as that has been laid out in advance by the 
cosmic order.7 
 
While the existentialist takes off from the phenomenological standpoint of human 
existence as freedom, the cosmological view arises from the standpoint of a given natural 
order. The modern view of the enlightenment period created a drastic shift from the 
cosmological perspective to a highly individualized conception of the “true self” as 
authentic.  
The modern view picks up on the general existentialist idea that the authentic self 
is not a given within the world, but rather a self-made individual to be distinguished from 
a socially constructed society. This view however, completely disregards the fact that 
                                                 
7 Charles Guignon, 13. 
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human beings exist in a social world. Regarding this view, Guignon describes the social 
self as being “other” than the authentic self.8 According to Guignon (and I agree), the 
problem with this highly individualized conception is that it neglects the social world in 
which we live and claims it as irrelevant to or contrary to authenticity; authenticity 
becomes entirely internal, while our social being becomes entirely outside of our “true 
selves”. The modern conception holds the authentic self to be a wholly internal self apart 
from the constructively fabricated social self. Guignon says of this conception that, 
The authentic self is the individual who can stand alone, shedding all status 
relations and social entanglements…The opposition between social existence and actual 
life provides the framework for the response envisioned in the ideal of becoming 
authentic.9 
 
While the earlier pre-modern view holds authenticity as a given placement within society 
entirely, in opposition, the modern view holds authenticity as wholly separate from 
society.  
Finally, Guignon describes the post-modern conception of authenticity as 
opposing the modern view of an internally (non-social) “true self”.10 On this view, the 
self turns out to be a by-product of society rather than being a part of the social order (the 
pre-modern cosmological view), or being solely internal and entirely removed from the 
social world (the modern individualistic view). In other words, the self is nothing other 
than what society has made it. On this view, to be authentic is to embrace a lack of self 
since the only self to be found is artificially shaped by society. The post-modern view 
                                                 
8 Charles Guignon, 33-35. 
  
9 Charles Guignon, 72. 
 
10 Charles Guignon, 117-19. 
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holds that there is not a self to be sought.11 Authenticity seems to lose traction as a 
valuable conception on this view almost entirely, since “the self” is found to be nothing. 
Guignon says, “We are true to ourselves… when we unflinchingly face the fact that there 
is nothing to be true to.”12 In some sense, this is closer to an existentialist conception, 
since the self is not a given, but is ultimately nothing. Still, this conception falls short of 
the existentialist’s phenomenological picture of human existence as freedom.  
Guignon critiques the different conceptions of authenticity, ultimately 
determining that a satisfying conception must go beyond a theory of self-discovery, self-
determinism, or “being true to oneself” (whatever that turns out to mean). Human beings 
do not exist in the world in a wholly internal way. Rather than falling into an overly 
individualistic account, Guignon suggests that we approach authenticity from the 
perspective of our existence in the world; that is in a social world with others. Guignon 
says, 
Seen from this point of view, becoming an authentic individual is not a matter of 
recoiling from society in order to find and express the inner self. What it involves is the 
ability to be a reflective individual who discerns what is genuinely worth pursuing within 
the social context in which he or she is situated.13 
 
Part of my project is to describe a socially constituted conception of authenticity. I think 
that an existentially grounded conception of authenticity might be responsive to 
Guignon’s concerns; existentialism in general is concerned with human existence, and 
our existence is within a social world. The phenomenological approach adopted by both 
                                                 
11 Charles Guignon, 119.  
 
12 Charles, Guignon, 120.  
 
13 Charles Guignon, 155, italics are mine. 
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Heidegger and Sartre, carries with it the social condition of human beings in their 
conceptions of authenticity. 
The specific case of authenticity that I plan to describe is one which is socially 
embedded in our current patriarchal society, namely, feminist authenticity. My argument 
is that feminist being is necessarily a mode of authenticity so long as one is a member of 
a patriarchal society, and further that this mode of being is valuable insofar as it fosters 
moral progress within a social context. I do not mean that authenticity necessarily 
requires feminism, rather that feminism in its most socially involved form is necessarily 
authentic in the relevant social context.  
Existential philosophers were not unaware of the social embeddedness of human 
beings; I hope to make some of their abstract conceptions of authenticity more concrete 
by applying their conceptions to the case of feminist authenticity. Guignon’s critique of 
recent conceptions of authenticity is that they have become too individualized and 
internal to the point of excluding the social nature of our existence as human beings. In 
agreement with this point, my own critique is that these different conceptions do not 
represent the important existential qualities that most cater to Guignon’s proposed 
conception of a socially involved characterization of authenticity. 
Existentialism grounds the concept of authenticity into the phenomenological 
characterization of human existence as we experience it. Since our lived experience is 
socially involved, an existential approach to authenticity will provide the social aspect 
that is missing from other conceptions. An existentialist approach will also guard against 
conceptions which distort the human experience into a wholly internal one devoid of 
social content. Another way to describe the difficulties of the conceptions which Guignon 
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discusses, is in terms of subjectivity and objectivity. The early cosmological account runs 
the risk of misrepresenting the human experience as an objective experience. On this 
view, to be in the world is to be objectively one’s place in the natural order. Conversely, 
the modern individualized account fails to place human existence in the social world at 
all, but instead plants our experience entirely into our subjectivity. Finally, the post-
modern conception fails to acknowledge human beings’ existence as freedom (i.e., as 
being able to choose among our possibilities).  
In Existence and Freedom, Calvin Schrag describes existentialism as a 
phenomenological method which lies beyond a subjective or objective approach to 
human existence.14 Schrag says, 
The existentialist concept of “being in the world,” arising from man’s pre-
theoretical encounter with his existential world of personal and practical concerns…is the 
primary phenomenological concept through which it becomes possible to undercut the 
subject-object dichotomy.15 
 
This is the heart of the response that existentialism offers a conception of authenticity; an 
authentic being is neither wholly objective nor subjective in lived experience, but rather 
exists in terms of both “personal and practical concerns,” to use Schrag’s words. 
Authentic being on this view, does not hinge on either side of the supposed dichotomy, 
but instead, as we will see, on human existence as freedom.   
 
 
                                                 
14 Calvin Schrag, Existence and Freedom, (Northwestern University Press, 1961).  
 
15 Calvin Schrag, 8.  
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CHAPTER 3 
HEIDEGGER: FALLING PREY 
Heidegger’s work is meant as an ontology from a standpoint of phenomenology.16 
In other words, Heidegger’s intention is to develop an ontology of human existence 
through an analysis of human experience. I am primarily concerned with Heidegger’s 
phenomenology of Da-sein’s being in the world with others, but it is also necessary to 
emphasize the finite existence of human beings. In Heideggarian terms, Da-sein simply 
put, means human being. Early on in his Being and Time, Heidegger distinguishes human 
beings from objects which have given attributes, 
The being which is concerned in its being about its being is related to its being as 
its ownmost possibility. Dasein is always its possibility. It does not ‘have’ that 
possibility only as a mere attribute of something objectively present.17 
 
This will be key in understanding why authenticity applies to human beings at all. While 
it seems obvious that human beings are not in existence in the same way that inanimate 
objects are, this distinction is what captures the phenomenological existence of human 
beings. Human beings are concerned with their own being in ways that other beings, and 
more obviously, objects are not. Human beings exist as possibility and every human 
being has the potential within itself to be authentically Da-sein, whereas objects do not 
have this sort of possibility. To exist as possibility is to give oneself purpose and 
meaning. According to Heidegger (and Sartre as we will see later), human beings are 
distinct from other beings and objects in that they do not exist as mere facticity. That is, 
                                                 
16 Heidegger, BT, 289. 
 
17 Heidegger, BT, 42. 
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Da-sein “does not express its what- as in the case of table, house, tree- but rather being 
(sein).”18 For example, a pencil does not have potential or possibility in the same way 
that I do because a pencil does not give itself its purpose. A pencil is given a very specific 
purpose, and any other purpose that it might serve will likely be for human projects. Da-
sein on the other hand, exists in terms of its possibilities, and further, is concerned with 
its very being and becoming, (i.e., its own possibilities). It seems obvious to point out that 
my pencil is not concerned with its own being and its own purpose; the pencil is simply 
given its purpose, namely, that of a writing utensil. But this distinction is an important 
one. Contrary to the pencil, I am not given a purpose. My purpose is in my own 
possibilities, and I am free to choose among those possibilities. For example: in so far as I 
am a student of philosophy, I am a student of philosophy because I choose to be so. In 
other words, I was not given the purpose or position of being a philosophy student as the 
pencil was given the purpose of being a writing utensil. We will see later that it is also 
important to note that when I choose to be a philosophy student, I am necessarily 
choosing not to be a number of other things.  
 According to Heidegger, human existence can take on two primary modes of 
being, authentic being, and inauthentic being. 19 Since human beings never exist merely 
objectively (i.e., in their facticity), they are always involved in their own human projects. 
Human beings are concerned with various projects, some as small and immediate as 
checking the mail or preparing a meal, others large and long-term such as attending 
graduate school, setting goals for the future, investing in a savings account, and the like. 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
 
19 Heidegger, BT, 42-44.  
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Heidegger discusses human projects in terms of care.20 Whether being in the mode of 
authenticity or the mode of inauthenticity, Da-sein is always care, is always involved in 
projects. I take this to mean that sometimes Da-sein is authentically involved in projects 
and other times Da-sein is inauthentically involved in projects. The task at hand is to 
determine what this means. 
 Heidegger does not deny that human beings exist with other human beings. As 
part of the thrownness of Da-sein, Da-sein exists within a certain context (i.e. within a 
certain space and time).21 That is, human beings are initially thrown into existence within 
a certain context. We are oriented within space and time, and further within a culture and 
a society. I take this aspect of human existence as particularly important to one’s 
potential authenticity. While Heidegger does not necessarily frame authentic being in 
terms of the social nature of our existence in the world, he does have something to say 
about societal influences in regard to human projects and possibilities. One aspect of 
inauthenticity according to Heidegger, occurs when Da-sein becomes overly involved in 
the average everydayness of being in the world with others.22 Sometimes (perhaps most 
of the time), human beings become extremely involved in the projects of social 
constructs, (e.g. finances, fashion, common social practices) norms, and everyday 
activities, leading to the neglect of other more authentic possibilities. Some of these 
possibilities may be practical ones, and others may not be, let us set this issue aside for 
the moment.  
                                                 
20 Heidegger, BT, 56-62. 
 
21 Heidegger, BT, 169-73. 
 
22 Heidegger, BT, 111-12, 123. 
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For example, suppose that Phil is so wholly involved in his job that he neglects 
other possibilities and ways of being that are important to him. Phil’s projects become 
overwhelmed with daily routines and practices all revolving around his job and the social 
practices involved with his co-workers. He wakes up every day at the same time so that 
he can stop and pick up coffees for his co-workers, he complains about the prices and 
slow service at the coffee shop, he becomes frustrated with the music on the radio and the 
traffic on the way to and from work. On the weekends Phil pre-occupies himself with 
keeping up on the latest trends in the office, Jim and Tom have new Apple watches, and 
Dave has the coolest neck-ties. The point to be made is this, Phil is certainly concerned 
with human projects, but the projects which he is concerning himself with are not his 
projects unless he chooses them as his own. In this example, not only has Phil tied 
himself up in the projects prescribed by society and social influence, but further he fails 
to regard his projects as chosen. Phil takes up projects merely because they are prescribed 
by society; he is losing his authentic self to the they or das-Man.23 Heidegger uses these 
two terms somewhat interchangeably; both refer to other human beings in the world with 
Das-sein. Human beings are in fact thrown into the world with others. Even in the case 
that one prefers to be alone and thus takes up the project of avoiding others, she still 
exists as mit-sein,  
But even when actual factical Dasein does not turn to others and thinks that it does not 
need them, it is in the mode of being-with.
24  
 
                                                 
23 Heidegger, BT, 111-26. 
 
24 Heidegger, BT, 120. 
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Heidegger understands that humans exist socially in the world and that their projects take 
place in the social world. Being authentic in regard to one’s social being involves some 
resistance to falling prey to the everydayness of Da-sein.25 In the example described 
above, Phil has fallen prey to the social norms and averageness of his everyday life, not 
because he participates in social projects, but because he takes them to be a given. Phil 
falls prey because he accepts his projects rather than choosing them as his own. To fall 
prey is to fall into a mode of being inauthentic. Note that it is possible that Phil could 
happen to prefer and thus freely choose societies prescribed projects freely. In this case, it 
remains possible that he authentically chooses those projects as his own.  
While this is certainly not all that Heidegger has to say about authenticity, his 
notion of human beings in society and falling prey are most relevant to my overall project 
of depicting a conception of feminist authenticity. Focusing on the current social, 
political, and cultural climate of current U.S. practices and norms, we, as Da-sein are 
thrown into a patriarchy. To fall prey in this context then, is in part to become in sync 
with the everdayness of our patriarchal society and to persist in projects and social roles 
which perpetuate oppressive social practices. Heidegger’s notions of falling prey, 
thrownness, and das-man are helpful in thinking about how we exist and persist in the 
world of patriarchy. Further, through these concepts we are given some indication of 
what authenticity might entail. According to Heidegger, one’s potential for authentic 
being in part hinges on in what ways one participates in everyday social practices and 
norms. Participation in society is not itself an indication of inauthentic being; the danger 
arises in the exclusion and abandonment of human possibilities. Does Phil take up his 
                                                 
25 Heidegger, BT, 175-81. 
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projects and choose them as his own among his human possibilities, or is he wholly 
influenced and submersed in what others are doing and expecting him to do? Do his 
projects further the freedoms and possibilities of human beings? In the case that Phil is 
being inauthentic, he is excluding from himself his own possibilities and ways of 
existing.   
I mentioned earlier that human beings may either authentically or inauthentically 
take up their projects. The take-away from Heidegger on this matter is that human 
existence is distinct in that it is concerned with its being. Insofar as Phil merely is what he 
is expected to be, and takes up the projects expected of him, he cannot authentically do so 
if he denies his existence as human possibility. What does this say about authentic being? 
Authentic being in society does not take the social roles and prescriptions as a given. 
Authentic being rather, considers the value of all possibilities within the social context 
that one finds themselves in and chooses those that best promote human possibility. 
Social practices are not necessarily contrary to human existence as freedom and 
possibility, however they do tend to threaten human existence as freedom; society 
presents its prescribed roles and practices as if they are factical (i.e., as if the prescribed 
roles are the nature of human existence). Authenticity thus does not require that one 
oppose social practices and norms, but that one does not accept them as a factical 
description of their being. To accept one’s being as possibility for Heidegger, it is further 
necessary that one accepts the inevitable certainty of death. Since it is possible that one 
die at any point, death is both a certainty and always a considerable possibility for da-
sein.  
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CHAPTER 4 
HEIDEGGER: DEATH AND ANGST 
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Since for human beings, death is a certain event, there is a kind of almost 
unavoidable anxiety when one confronts their future possibilities since one of those 
possibilities is always death. One of the dangers of falling prey is that the submersion in 
everydayness distances da-sein from her being toward death. That is, one way to avoid 
one’s natural anxiety about death is to avoid it as a possibility and instead busy oneself 
with the averageness, or the “every day indifference” of day to day living.26 Since Da-
sein is defined by its concern for its own being, indifference about being is inauthentic. 
From this fallen perspective, death becomes something distant which happens not to me 
and my loved ones, but to others.27 Society further dictates the proper manner of dealing 
with death; there are prescribed ways of grieving and limits upon how much grieving is 
enough or too much. It is not thought of as healthy to concern oneself with death as a 
possibility without cause,  
Even thinking about death is regarded publicly as cowardly fear, a sign of 
insecurity on the part of Da-sein and a dark flight from the world. The they does not 
permit the courage to have angst about death.28 
 
To be authentic, Da-sein must face her own being toward death. Since human 
beings are beings which are concerned with their own existence, and further, 
beings which concern themselves with their future existence and future 
possibilities, it is necessary that authentic Da-sein face her existence as finite. In 
other words, authentic Da-sein is responsible for her finite life project. To fall 
prey is to avoid this responsibility (thereby avoiding angst) by becoming 
                                                 
26 Heidegger, BT, 43. 
 
27 Heidegger, BT, 243. 
 
28 Heidegger, BT, 244. 
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immersed in averageness. To be inauthentic is to avoid one’s existence as 
possibility, and to avoid one’s existence as possibility is to avoid one’s existence 
as being toward death.  
It is tempting for Da-sein to elude the inevitable possibility of death, 
because such a possibility evokes an anguishing feeling. However, the authentic 
way to confront this feeling is to take responsibility for future possibilities and 
take up concern for one’s overall life project. This sort of forward thinking can 
also cause one to feel angst about the future, this is because we are our 
possibilities and for this we are responsible. The easiest way to avoid angst is to 
submerge oneself into the average everydayness of das-man, and submit to a life 
of inauthentic being. To escape one’s feelings of angst and responsibility, one 
may become submersed in a prescribed life rather than taking responsibility for 
the forming of one’s own path. The take away from Heidegger is thus not to 
entirely disentangle oneself from society, but to face your existence in society as 
possibility within that society and to confront your finite time in the world. Note 
that this interpretation embraces both Heidegger’s conception of authenticity, as 
well as Guignon’s suggestion that the concept of authenticity entail social aspect. 
Authenticity and inauthenticity are both socially involved; the key for being 
authentic is in how one chooses to face one’s being toward death within their 
social context. To be authentic is thus to be concerned with one’s being (towards 
death and within a thrown social context), rather than choosing projects 
indifferently (thereby escaping human existence as freedom and being toward 
18 
 
death). Authentic persons are not indifferent about their projects, but are 
concerned with them and aware of their responsibility for choosing them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
SARTRE: BAD FAITH AND FREEDOM 
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Sartre shares some similar intuitions with Heidegger regarding human beings as 
possibility; Sartre also has his own language for describing human beings as not wholly 
factical. For Sartre, the primary distinctions to be made between human existence and the 
existence of objects are between the ordering of essence and existence,29 which will 
correlate with the in-itself, and the for-itself.30 According to Sartre, in the case of human 
beings, existence always precedes essence, where as in the case of objects, essence 
precedes the existence of the object. For example, when I write this paper, the essence of 
the project is very much in place prior to the completion of the paper. I give the project 
its essence before the thing exists. Unlike objects, whose essence is given, human beings 
are constantly choosing their own essence. In order to connect these conceptions of 
essence, possibility, and freedom to authenticity, Sartre fills in these concepts in terms of 
bad faith.31 Sartre’s concept of bad faith is meant to articulate a mode of failing to be 
authentic, (i.e., failing to exist authentically toward oneself, toward others, and toward the 
world). I am not going to delve into a definition of authenticity here as bad faith is itself 
the negation of authenticity. Through Sartre’s concept of bad faith, we get a device for 
creating more concrete examples of what authenticity (and as I will later argue, feminist 
authenticity) looks like.  
Bad faith is first and foremost a form of deception. However, Sartre is careful in 
distinguishing mere deception from a special sort of self-deception.32 To be in bad faith is 
                                                 
29 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, trans. Carol Macomber (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2007), 21-22. 
 
30 Sartre, BN, 96-99. 
 
31 Sartre, BN, 96-158.  
32 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (Washington Square Press, 1956), 86-
91. 
20 
 
to hide the truth of freedom, possibility and thus responsibility from oneself. While this 
sort of self-deception may very well dupe others as well, it is directed at oneself. Bad 
faith is to some extent an intentional escape from the freedom to choose oneself; it is a 
way to avoid the responsibility that human freedom entails. Just as Heidegger discusses 
angst or anguish, Sartre discusses fear of freedom as anxiety. A person cannot be 
authentic if they deceive themselves about their very being, that is their existence as 
freedom. To be clear, there is no necessary contradiction in the case of an authentic liar, 
for the authentic liar does not attempt to deceive himself; nevertheless, it may also be the 
case that the liar is in bad faith regarding her lies to others.  
Consider the following example, Phil’s wife has a habit of forgetting to set an 
alarm when the cookies are in the oven. As a result of her forgetfulness, she often burns 
the cookies. Phil lies to his wife, and claims that he loves the taste of burnt cookies. 
Insofar as Phil is merely attempting to relieve his wife’s disappointment, Phil is not 
necessarily in bad faith. At this point, his deception is aimed toward his wife, not himself. 
Suppose further that Phil’s wife is wholly deceived and so takes to burning the cookies 
on purpose just for Phil. If Phil does not relinquish the truth about his distaste of burnt 
cookies but continues to lie to his wife and further to himself about his tastes for cookies, 
then he may be in danger of falling into bad faith. Suppose that Phil continues on eating 
burnt cookies and convincing himself and his wife that he loves them, he may escape the 
possibility of telling the truth which would likely disappoint his wife. However, the key is 
whether or not Phil takes up the role of eating and preferring burnt cookies as if he has no 
other choice in the matter. That is, if Phil moves to convince himself that he is doomed to 
eat burnt cookies for the rest of his life, then he deceives himself. Only if Phil rejects that 
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the possibility of telling the truth is an option is he in bad faith in regard to his tastes for 
cookies. Of course, this is a silly example, but the point is, bad faith requires a sufficient 
amount of self-deception about one’s possibilities, i.e. freedom to choose.  
The cookie case brings about an important point, that a person can be involved in 
small acts of bad faith, and/or much more significant acts of bad faith. In fact, it may be 
the case that some small acts of bad faith throughout one’s life are nearly impossible to 
avoid, but I take Sartre to be more concerned with the case of living one’s life as a whole 
in bad faith. It is one thing to hide from yourself the possibility of enjoying a fresh 
unburnt cookie, but quite another to hide from yourself the possibility of living in accord 
with your core values or moral beliefs and the like.  After all, Phil may possibly even 
benefit in his relationship to his wife if he persists in this one repetitive act of bad faith, 
but there are far more detrimental modes of being in bad faith. Later I will discuss some 
examples which fall somewhere in-between the mundane and the detrimental. 
For now, I am interested in clarifying the concept a bit further. This will require 
the addition of two more concepts which Sartre calls being in-itself and being for-itself. 
The meanings of these concepts are derived from objectivity and subjectivity, 
respectively. This is Sartre’s way of further differentiating things from persons. Things 
exist in the world with a given essence whereas human beings do not. In the earlier 
section on Heidegger I used the example of the pencil, Sartre uses the example of a paper 
knife,  
We cannot suppose that a man would produce a paper knife without knowing 
what purpose it would serve. Let us say therefore, that the essence of the paper knife-that 
22 
 
is, the sum of formulae and properties that enable it to be produced and defined-precedes 
its essence.
33
 
 
This distinction is important in terms of bad faith, not simply because a manufactured 
object cannot be in bad faith, rather because it is in a way this feigned mode of pretending 
to be as the object is that a person can be in bad faith. Human beings are not as objects 
are; we do not begin with an essence, rather we choose our essence. Consider another of 
Sartre’s examples,  
I can not say either that I am here or that I am not here, in the sense that we may 
say ‘that box of matches is on the table’, this would be to confuse my ‘being-in-the-
world’ with a ‘being-in-the-midst-of-the-world.’.34  
 
The paper knife, the box of matches, the table, are all things in-themselves, whereas 
persons are things for-themselves. To deny the freedom of one’s subjectivity is to deceive 
oneself into a confusion about being-in oneself rather than being-for oneself; this is bad 
faith. To be sure, bad faith is not a clean and clear concept. Sartre himself admits that the 
best way to gain any degree of desired clarification on the matter is to examine 
exemplary cases of bad faith.35 I hope to at this point have provided the conceptual tools 
needed to examine bad faith a bit more critically.  
For the purpose of establishing a baseline I will begin with Sartre’s own example: 
Suppose that there is a waiter at a cafe,  
                                                 
33 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, Trans. Carol Macomber (New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press, 2007), 21. 
 
34 Sartre, BN, 103. 
 
35 Sartre, BN, 96. 
23 
 
His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. He comes 
toward the patrons with a step a little too quick. He bends forward a little too eagerly; his 
voice, his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous for the order of the customer.36 
 
 Sartre says that this waiter is in bad faith. One might inquire as to why this waiter, doing 
the precise actions of a waiter must be in bad faith. The waiter leaves his patrons as well 
as himself with no indication that he is for-himself his own possibilities. That is, he 
“plays at being a waiter” to use Sartre’s words, as if he simply is a waiter. Let’s examine 
the text closely: 
What I attempt to realize is a being-in-itself of the café waiter, as if it were not 
just in my power to confer their value and their urgency upon my duties and the rights of 
my position, as if it were not my free choice to get up each morning at five O’ clock or to 
remain in bed, even though it meant getting fired. As if from the very fact that I sustained 
this role in existence I did not transcend it on every side, as if I did not constitute myself 
as one beyond my condition. Yet there is no doubt that I am in a sense the café waiter- 
otherwise could I not just as well call myself a diplomat or a reporter? But if I am one, 
this cannot be in the mode of being-in-itself. I am a waiter in the mode of being what I 
am not.37 
 
Here Sartre gives us several reasons as to why this particular waiter is in bad faith. He 
goes about the business of being a waiter as if it is not the case that he chooses to be a 
waiter in each of his waiting actions, including his waking up each morning on time, as 
though his very being determines that he must do so. The point is in part that the waiter 
chooses to play the role of being a waiter, but does not acknowledge his possibilities to 
freely choose otherwise nor does he acknowledge that he chooses to be a waiter in each 
of his actions as he works; he ignores the negation of other possibilities in his choosing as 
such. The second part, as stated at the end of the quote emphasizes that insofar as the 
                                                 
36 Sartre, BN, 101. 
 
37 Sartre, BN, 103.  
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waiter is a waiter, he is so merely in the mode of not being his other possibilities, yet he 
plays at being a waiter as if to be a waiter is to be him.  
After a close look at Sartre’s café waiter, the how and why of the waiter’s bad 
faith becomes clear. However, the social reality of persons in their everyday lives is far 
more complicated than that of the waiter as depicted. To be clear, Sartre admits of social 
influence and intricacy, but many of his examples are simplified for the purposes of 
conceptual clarification. I am interested in examining a more complicated example of 
what it might mean to be in bad faith. Some questions that I hope to pull out in this 
discussion include: first, does bad faith only relate to deception about possibilities, or is it 
also relevant to taking responsibility for choices? Second, can one choose X in bad faith 
at one point in life, and then later choose X authentically? Third, Are there varying 
degrees of bad faith?  
Suppose that Phil is the waiter in the café. Let us assume all the above from 
Sartre’s example about Phil while he is at work. Phil works forty hours a week waiting 
tables at the café and makes good money which helps to support his family. Phil’s true 
passion is art; he has always wanted to be an artist. Phil spends a few hours a week 
working on his paintings and sketches. Phil hereby chooses to be a waiter and chooses art 
as a mere hobby despite his desire to choose otherwise. Insofar as Phil does not 
acknowledge his choice to be a waiter over an artist, or his choice to pursue art as a mere 
hobby rather than a career, he is in bad faith. It seems clear in terms of Sartre, Phil is in 
bad faith because he denies himself the free possibility of quitting his job at the café and 
becoming an artist. Note that authenticity does not require that Phil quit his job and 
become an artist, it requires that he acknowledge his choosing what to be and what not to 
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be in any case. Phil chooses to be a waiter each and every time he goes to work and with 
each action while he works. Phil gets up every day at five O’ clock in the morning as if 
he is not choosing not to become an artist each day. Phil is choosing not to become an 
artist each time he chooses to be a waiter at the café. Sartre says,  
And what is the goal of bad faith? To cause me to be what I am, in the mode of ‘not being 
what one is,’ or not to be what I am in the mode of ‘being what one is.’ We find here the 
same game of mirrors. In fact, in order for me to have an intention of sincerity, I must at 
the outset simultaneously be and not be what I am.38 
 
Here Sartre means that Phil is not merely playing at being a waiter, while also being Phil 
otherwise, e.g. a husband, father, painter… rather Phil deceives himself into the mode of 
being a waiter full stop. But Phil cannot be a waiter in the same way that the pencil is a 
pencil. Phil is thus in bad faith in three distinct ways: Phil escapes his own possibility to 
be other than a waiter (e.g. an artist), he escapes his actual being other than a waiter, and 
he escapes his responsibility for choosing to be a waiter. Now let’s give Phil a bit more 
reality; bad faith may be quite difficult to avoid under the pressure of real world 
conditions.  
Suppose that Phil chose to become a waiter because that was the best option 
available to him at the time, and he needed the money to support his family. Phil applied 
to the café because he and his wife had only one car and his wife needed the car to get 
their child to school and take herself to work twenty miles away. Phil could walk to the 
café each morning, and the money would be good. Suppose that Phil knew that he could 
instead work from home as an artist and sell his paintings on the weekends for less 
money. In this sense, Phil authentically chose to wait tables instead. Phil weighed the 
                                                 
38 Sartre, BN, 110.  
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possible options, acknowledging his freedom to choose and prioritize his possibilties, and 
felt that the most responsible choice was to accept the job at the café. I think that Phil can 
have made an authentic choice ten years ago, but now be in bad faith regarding that same 
choice. Over time, Phil has convinced himself that he is stuck being a waiter at the café. 
Further suppose that Phil’s wife got a big promotion and large pay increase, but Phil fails 
to regain responsibility for his freedom; Phil fails to revisit his prior choice, and in this 
failure, he escapes both his continuing freedom to choose otherwise, and his continuing 
responsibility for choosing as he does. Thus, Phil’s formerly authentic choice to become 
a waiter has become a repetitive act of bad faith over time, since he fails to regard any of 
his other possibilities, including that of being an artist. Note also that even in the case that 
it is never financially practical for Phil to choose an art career over waiting at the cafe, 
the possibility still stands. The key is whether Phil acknowledges his freedom to choose 
even the most impractical of possibilities as well as his freedom to continue choosing a 
thing for the sake of practicality. Phil may fail to choose authentically in part because he 
fails to realize that he is choosing to prioritize based upon chosen values or standards. 
Insofar as Phil chooses to be a waiter, he chooses to value the practicality of this choice 
over his other possibilities. To deny that he has made the choice either way is to deny his 
very existence as possibility and confuse his existence with one of a given essence. 
 So far, I hope to have established two things: first, bad faith has to do with the 
denial of freedom as well as some denial about responsibility. Second, the condition of 
bad faith can develop over time; an authentic choice now might not be an authentic 
choice to maintain down the road; one must continually make choices and take 
responsibility for them even if the same choice is made repeatedly, as is often the case. 
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To maintain some measure of authenticity, one must revisit one’s possibilities and choose 
accordingly. Further, Phil’s early financial situation certainly confined his choices in 
some way, (though Phil is always free), yet he was able to authentically choose the 
waiting position despite his passion for art, so long as he was aware of his other 
possibilities, however impractical they may have been at the time. Phil is authentic if he 
acknowledges that his choosing to be or do a thing is also his choosing not to be or not to 
do other things, and further acknowledging his decision to value some choices over 
others (e.g., choosing to value practicality over creative desire). If one truly 
acknowledges one’s choices, then one may also realize that many choices also 
presuppose an underlying value of some sort which is thereby also freely chosen. 
Neither Sartre nor Heidegger discuss values in terms of freedom, but I argue that 
values must play a role. When one makes a choice and acts on it, one is in effect choosing 
a value of some sort. Phil in the above example has chosen financial stability. However, 
over time, Phil fails to take responsibility for this chosen value. First, he ceases to 
acknowledge his choices as free. Phil may choose authentically to remain a waiter so 
long as he acknowledges that he holds these two values: financial stability, and artistic 
creation. He must then also assume responsibility for choosing one value in his actions 
over the other. Instead, Phil acts as though he has no choice in the matter. I turn now to 
the question of bad faith in degree.  
I am not sure that Sartre had any sort of scale in mind when he developed his 
concept of bad faith. But it seems to me possible that bad faith may function this way; I 
will argue that it does. Consider a new case: Phil works as a bookstore clerk. Phil firmly 
believes that one ought not to go to work when one is ill. The bookstore management 
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frowns upon any instance of absence unless one is in the hospital. The employees at the 
bookstore all feel shame when they call off of work due to a common illness (one which 
does not require a visit to the doctor). Phil’s co-worker tells Phil one day that she is 
feeling ill, and will be very uncomfortable at work. Phil advises his friendly co-worker to 
call off for the day, explaining that one’s job is not as important as one’s health and the 
health of others. Phil says that it is the right thing to do, and that management ought to 
respect that. Suppose that a few weeks later, Phil is ill. Phil feels much pressure to go to 
work, he does not want to face management later in the week when he returns if he calls 
off now. Phil goes to work. Is Phil in bad faith? Insofar as Phil admits that he ought to 
have called off, and that he was free to do so, he seems not to be in bad faith. He labored 
in much deliberation before deciding to go to work after all. Yet Phil is in some sense 
convincing himself that he must go to work, due to the authoritative pressure that he feels 
from his management and perhaps his peers. I pose that Phil is to some degree in bad 
faith. Phil is aware of his possibilities, yet, he is denying his responsibility for his choice, 
and instead, blaming it on his managers and the pressures which they enforce upon their 
employees. Phil is not being wholly authentic. If this is correct, then bad faith may be a 
matter of degree; one can be in bad faith in regard to responsibility for freedom even 
when one is not in bad faith regarding one’s possibilities. I further propose that another 
scaling factor may be found in how consistent one is regarding their chosen values.  
In the example above, Phil holds two values and chooses among them. In this 
case, his values are not necessarily contradictory. One can hold both a value for financial 
stability as well as a value for artistic creativity. Thus, in that case as we have discussed 
it, this factor may not play a part in the scale of Phil’s authenticity. However, it seems to 
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me that, if one holds two separate values which are inconsistent with one another, then 
any time that person acts upon either value they are in danger of acting in bad faith. In 
such a case the person is likely deceiving themselves about their holding one value or the 
other. For example, if I value human equality whilst also valuing tall people over short 
people, then I hold inconsistent values. Thus, any time I act on one or the other I am in 
danger of acting in bad faith. If my choices reflect my bias about the height of those that I 
interact with, then I am not assuming responsibility for my choosing also to value human 
equality. While consistency does not arise in Sartre’s discussion of bad faith, I think that 
the concept implies a standard of consistency, for how can I freely acknowledge and take 
responsibility for my choices if I deceive myself about the values in which I am enacting 
upon? If I were entirely honest with myself I would have to confront my inconsistent 
values and choices.  
I have explained the nature of bad faith in terms of Sartre’s concepts, in-itself and 
for-itself, where an authentic person is in the mode of being for-themselves rather than 
feigning a mode of in-themselves as objects are in-themselves. I hope to have further 
clarified what it means to be in bad faith. I have argued that bad faith can be 
conceptualized as: 1) the denial of one’s freedom and thus the denial of one’s 
possibilities, 2) the denial of one’s responsibility for one’s choosing, 3) in respect to both 
1 and 2, it is possible to conceive of bad faith as a matter of degree; the self-deception 
involved may be more in line with 1 than 2 or the contrary, thus it is possible for one to 
be partially inauthentic about an act or a choice. Further, inconsistency between choices 
may very well indicate choices made in bad faith.  
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Consider the Phil case from the above section on Heidegger: Phil has subjected 
himself to the everydayness of das-man. Suppose that Phil is very unsatisfied with his 
job, he does not like being stuck in an office all day interacting primarily with a computer 
screen. Suppose further that Phil is in bad faith; he is so enveloped in his work (which he 
does not like), that he neglects his passions and his possibilities to fulfill those passions. 
He goes home and dwells on the “fact” that he must be at work again in the morning. But 
it is no fact that he must be there, he chooses to be there. Perhaps he has very good 
reasons for choosing to be there. Still, he fails to acknowledge his existence as freedom, 
instead deceiving himself into the mode of the in-itself.39 Phil must at the very least, 
acknowledge that his being what he is, is never just what he is. Further he must keep in 
mind that he chooses his being both in the present and in the future, for his future is 
always possibility. He deceives himself into believing that he is an office manager. In an 
understanding of bad faith, we come to realize a mode of being inauthentic toward one’s 
freedom, possibility, and responsibility (i.e., one’s existence). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 Sartre’s notion of lying to oneself is arguably problematic as he himself addresses, BN, 112-116. For 
more see Catalano, and Santoni.  
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CHAPTER 6 
AN EXISTENTIALIST FOUNDATION FOR AUTHENTICITY 
For both Heidegger and Sartre, authentic being has to do with one’s existence as 
other than mere facticity. For our purposes, we can take from Heidegger that it is 
important to avoid becoming overly involved in everyday projects that are the projects of 
society rather than one’s own authentic projects within that society. Heidegger’s notion 
of society, or the they is particularly relevant, especially since Sartre does not himself 
frame human life in this context explicitly in terms of authenticity. Heidegger’s notion of 
thrownness yields significant content for da-sein; da-sein always finds itself in a context. 
In the case of da-sein in the U.S., this context (among other things) is a patriarchal 
context. For both Heidegger and Sartre, humans exist as possibility, though for Sartre 
(and I take this to be very important) freedom plays a large role in terms of human 
existence. Human existence for Sartre is freedom, and I think that freedom entails a 
certain amount of responsibility for becoming. Human beings are always becoming their 
own essence, but perhaps too often we become what we think we are expected to 
become; that is, we fool ourselves into thinking that we are our place in society and 
nothing more; we forget that we have some choice in how we participate in society and 
what we value within society.  
The existential aspect of authenticity will of course encompass the essential 
concepts of freedom and possibility. One cannot exist and persist authentically in the 
world without taking up the general project of freedom as possibility since human beings 
are freedom and possibility. To demand of anyone that freedom always be at the 
forefront of mind is likely far too much to ask. But in living an authentic life at large, one 
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must not wholly deny one’s freedom to choose one’s own essence. This is not a one-time 
choice, but an ongoing one. A further aspect of authenticity is entailed by not deceiving 
oneself about the necessity of one’s projects.  
Given our thrownness, part of our life projects will always be social, but we can 
still choose how we interact with our social world, which projects are worthwhile, which 
projects we choose to take up as our own, and perhaps most importantly, what we choose 
to contribute to the world we live in. Note that not all possibilities are equally available in 
a practical sense to all people, this is especially true in any case of oppression. My aim 
here is to suggest that feminism is the project of expanding the possibilities of the 
oppressed by acknowledging our freedom to choose our projects within our social world. 
On this front, we need to add something to the existentialist picture. 
We have an existential foundation for a conception of authenticity which 
accommodates our existence as social beings. Through the examples of falling prey and 
bad faith we have gained some criteria for determining authenticity. From Heidegger, we 
see first that human beings are thrown into a context, which happens to be a social one. 
Heidegger’s notion of the they, or das-man gives us a picture of what our social context 
looks like; society to some extent seeks to give human beings certain roles and projects 
which shape our everyday being in the world. From Sartre’s notion of bad faith, we can 
frame Heidegger’s conception of falling prey. Through examples of bad faith, we can see 
how a person becomes inauthentic within their social context. To be in bad faith is to 
deny one’s existence as freedom. Both Heidegger and Sartre are concerned with the same 
idea regarding our social existence. Authenticity requires that one embrace one’s freedom 
and assume responsibility for one’s finite life project. To assume this responsibility is to 
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choose projects and values based upon one’s freedom rather than one’s prescribed 
projects and social roles as if one were not a human being (existing as freedom), but a 
factical being. While this is a good starting point for developing a conception of 
authenticity, my own conception will add a content-relevant component to the existential 
conception. I will develop this component of authenticity from Simone De Beauvior’s 
existentialist ethics.  
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CHAPTER 7 
DE BEAUVOIR: ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF EXISTENTIALISM 
In The Ambiguity of Ethics, Simone De Beauvior highlights the ethical relevance 
of existentialism. I will apply the ethical elements of De Beauvior’s existential 
philosophy to our existential conception of authenticity which we have already developed 
from Heidegger and Sartre thus far. De Beauvior has her own language for discussing 
various states of being that people may choose. Several of these states can be applied to 
our scaler conception of authenticity. Going forward, my goal is to explain these states in 
the terms of Heidegger and Sartre which we have discussed and developed up to this 
point.  
The first state of being is that of the “sub-man”.40 The sub-man can be compared 
to a person who is in bad faith. The sub-man takes the conditions of her thrownness as 
facticity, too seriously. Her projects are the projects of the world and society that she has 
been thrown into; the sub-man takes these projects (which have been established prior to 
her or his existence) as given facticity. De Beauvoir says, “Ethics is the triumph of 
freedom over facticity, and the sub-man feels only the facticity of his existence.”41 She 
goes on to say, “He loses himself in the object in order to annihilate his subjectivity.”42 In 
the case of Sartre’s waiter, or Phil the waiter, the waiter is in the state of the sub-man. 
The waiter is in bad faith for all the reasons which we have established, and this 
condition corresponds with the condition of the sub-man. Somewhere along the scale of 
                                                 
40 De Beauvior, EA, 45-49, 54-55. 
 
41 De Beauvoir, EA, 48.  
 
42 De Beauvior, EA, 49. 
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authenticity that I have proposed, a few more of De Beauvior’s concepts can be applied. 
That of the nihilist, the adventurer, and the passionate.  
Apart from the sub-man, the nihilist is closest to bad faith, and in De Beauvior’s 
terms, the sub-man or the serious. The nihilist, instead of taking her thrown condition too 
seriously, takes her existence as nothingness too seriously.43 That is, the nihilist 
recognizes that she exists as freedom, and thus rejects any given facticity or societally 
proscribed projects. The mistake of the nihilist is that this person does not take up the 
project of freedom, but rather embraces a role of not being. De Beauvior says,  
The fundamental fault of nihilist is that, challenging all given values, he does 
not find, beyond their ruin, the importance of that universal, absolute end which freedom 
itself is.44 
 
Here we see the ethical implication of existentialism in De Beauvior’s philosophy come 
forward. The ultimate goal of freedom for oneself and for others who also exist as freedom 
is a moral compass of sorts. To recognize existence as freedom and yet confine it into a 
mode of objectivity (i.e., the in-itself), is to fall back into a denial of existing as freedom, 
and thus a denial of oneself. According to De Beauvior, all values and significant projects 
are founded upon freedom.45  
 Unlike the nihilist who does not exercise her freedom, the adventurer recognizes 
her freedom and the possibility to choose and become. The adventurer embraces her own 
freedom, but does not wholly acknowledge human existence as freedom. That is, the 
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adventurer makes the mistake of enforcing her own freedom against others’. For example, 
Hitler recognized and acted upon his freedom enough to drastically alter the situation that 
he was thrown into. However, Hitler failed to recognize freedom as an ultimate end (i.e., 
as an end for himself and for humanity at large). De Beauvior says of the adventurer,  
The man we call the adventurer, on the contrary, is one who remains indifferent to the 
content, that is, to the human meaning of action, who thinks he can assert his own existence 
without taking into account that of others.46 
 
In terms of authenticity, the adventurer is to some degree in bad faith. The 
adventurer is not in bad faith regarding her own freedom or responsibility for 
choosing for herself, but instead fails to acknowledge the freedom of other human 
beings, and thus human existence as freedom. I have before mentioned that 
consistency within one’s chosen values and projects is relevant within the scale of 
authenticity; the adventurer is not honest with herself about the equivalence of her 
own freedom with that of all other peoples’.  
De Beauvior stresses that the content of the adventurer’s projects fails to be 
genuine, while it is the subjectivity of the passionate person that is neglected.47 The 
passionate are those who become engulfed in their own projects so much so that 
they become closed to possibilities outside of their project. Their project becomes 
an “absolute” rather than a possibility.48 The passionate person may choose their 
values and their project without taking too seriously societies proscribed values and 
projects, but then becomes confined to their project and is subject to a being of the 
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in-itself. According to De Beauvoir, for a project to be existentially moral, it must 
entail freedom as its ultimate goal,  
An end is valid only by a return to the freedom which established it and which 
willed itself through this end. But this will implies that freedom is not to be engulfed in 
any goal; neither is it to dissipate itself vainly without aiming at a goal.49 
 
The passionate person’s project may contain existentially moral content, but the 
confinement of the in-itself attempts to escape freedom by way of deception. 
Passionate persons deceive themselves into believing that the ends of their projects 
are fixed and absolute.  
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CHAPTER 8 
                    AUTHENTICITY ON MORAL GROUND 
With the consideration of De Beauvoir’s existential ethics, we are able to 
establish an ethically valuable conception of authenticity. On my view, a person is 
authentic within their social context when they are socially involved in such a way as to 
promote freedom and possibility for themselves and others. This alone may be 
combatable with the existential picture that we get from Sartre and Heidegger. However, 
on my view, the existential picture is missing a content oriented component which makes 
authenticity an ethically valuable concept; De Beauvior’s existential ethics will add this 
content relevant component to the conception of authenticity established in this project. 
The problem with the conception we have developed thus far, is that it leaves open the 
possibility of harmful or counter-productive authentic projects. By Harmful, I have in 
mind projects which are freely (regarding the criteria drawn from Sartre and Heidegger) 
chosen, but which undermine the well-being and success of members of society, which is 
counter-productive for human existence in general. Though there are some ethical 
implications in Heidegger and Sartre50, their views are susceptible to the criticism that 
authentic being is a “content-neutral” state of being.51 That is, the content of one’s chosen 
projects and values is unrestricted. If this is the case, then it is possible that one can 
authentically take up a harmful project (e.g., the project of oppressing women).  
                                                 
50 For further reading on the ethical implications of Heidegger and Sartre, see respectively, Lawrence 
Vogel, The Fragile “We”: Ethical Implications of Heidegger’s Being and Time, (Northwestern University 
Press, 1994), and Jean-Paul Sartre, Notebooks for an Ethics, trans. David Pellauer, (The University of 
Chicago Press1992). 
 
51 Marilyn Freidman uses the term “content-neutral” in her discussion of conceptions of autonomy. See, 
Marilyn Freidman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics, (Oxford University Press). 
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In his book, The Fragile “We”: Ethical Implications of Heidegger’s Being and 
Time, Lawrence Vogel states that under one interpretation of Heidegger, to have a moral 
conscience is necessarily to fall prey to the moral conventions of society and thus to be 
inauthentic.52 On this interpretation, to be immersed in the moral prescriptions of society 
and its expectations is to fall prey. Vogel says, 
The only thing I “know” in listening to the “silent call of conscience” is that I 
bear responsibility for what I make of the circumstances in which I find myself. The 
imperatives of moral conscience tempt me to be inauthentic because they promise to 
settle the issue of who I am to be by appeal to a given and impersonal measure.53 
 
According to Heidegger, the “silent call of conscience” is in a sense the call toward 
authenticity, that is it speaks to the existence of Da-sein and its freedom. On the other 
hand, Heidegger discusses morality in terms of moral conscience which is dictated by the 
they or das-man. In his critical look at Heidegger’s discussion of moral conscience, we 
see the dilemma for the existentialist conception of authenticity. Authenticity on this 
reading only asks that one embrace one’s existence as freedom and assume responsibility 
for choices (whether those choices are good or bad by any measure). One can relinquish 
one’s responsibility by submitting to the prescriptions (moral or other) of society and 
escape one’s anxiety about freedom and finitude or one can embrace one’s existence as 
freedom and assume responsibility for choosing what to value (i.e., what is good, bad, or 
other). Sartre’s notion of bad faith is susceptible to this same criticism.  
 Through our examples of falling prey and bad faith we have seen that authenticity 
requires one to accept responsibility for one’s existence as freedom. I propose that we 
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add De Beauvoir’s content-relevant amendment to this existentialist foundation for a 
conception of authenticity. This view will add to the existentialist conception that what 
one freely chooses to value may be either authentic or inauthentic. The criteria that will 
determine the authenticity of free choices will still be grounded in the existentialist 
concepts that we have discussed thus far, including those of De Beauvoir. Finally, with 
the concepts and criterial established thus far, we can examine the case of feminist 
authenticity.  
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CHAPTER 9 
ON THE ROAD TO FEMINIST AUTHENTICITY 
To be of a feminist mind involves a certain awareness of social context. I do not 
think that such an awareness alone will constitute feminist authenticity, but it may be 
required to be authentically feminist. Sandra Lee Bartky has a firm idea of what feminist 
awareness is in her conception of feminist consciousness.54 According to Bartky, feminist 
consciousness arises when an agent becomes aware of the possibility of things being not 
as they are. A woman for example must become aware that her oppressed condition 
ought not to be the case, and further, that it does not have to be the case (i.e., it is possible 
that society be structured differently and/or she orient herself differently toward it). Once 
an agent reaches this conclusion, she is aware of her social condition in a different way. 
She becomes sensitive to ways in which things could be different for herself, and women 
in general. While an agent could perceive gender injustice and even have a distaste 
toward it, feminist consciousness is something more than that. Bartky says, 
Women have long lamented their condition, but lament, pure and simple, need 
not be an expression of feminist consciousness. As long as their situation is 
apprehended as natural, inevitable, and inescapable, women’s consciousness of 
themselves, no matter how alive to insult and inferiority, is not yet feminist 
consciousness. This consciousness… emerges only when there exists a genuine 
possibility for the partial or total liberation of women.55 
 
Feminist consciousness contains within itself a notion of escaping a particular condition 
which is oppressive rather than merely recognizing the condition as oppressive. My view 
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is that one cannot become authentically feminist without first reaching this sort of 
consciousness. As we have seen, authenticity requires an acceptance of existence as 
possibility. It is therefore a move toward authenticity to first become aware of possibility.  
There are certain conflicting standards that one will become aware of at the point 
of reaching a feminist consciousness, and this awareness may result in feelings of anxiety 
about one’s place in a patriarchal social context, Bartky says, “we understand what we 
are and where we are in the light of what we are not yet.”56 Feminist consciousness is 
consciousness of possibility, while authentic feminism is existence as possibility; 
feminist consciousness entails an awareness of other possibilities for women, this is 
important for authenticity as we have seen in earlier sections of the paper. The relevant 
possibility for the feminist to authentically strive for, is that of women not being 
oppressed within her society. 
We might wonder what it means to become aware of one’s oppression in a 
feminist way. I think that Marilyn Frye’s defining of oppression picks up on these notions 
of conflicting standards and different possibilities. Frye targets within the word 
‘oppression’, the word ‘press’, and from this she derives a very insightful and useful 
definition:  
Something pressed is something caught between or among forces and barriers 
which are so related to each other that jointly they restrain, restrict or prevent the 
thing’s motion or mobility. Mold. Immobilize. Reduce.57 
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Working from this definition, feminist consciousness gains a focused awareness of what 
oppression actually does; oppression constrains and restricts one’s possibilities. 
Oppression confines freedom. This awareness brings to light the idea that other 
conditions are possible, conditions which would yield further possibilities. From an 
existentialist standpoint, oppression restricts one’s very being as human. Further, a firm 
grasping of this definition will bring light to various sorts of barriers, and conflicting 
standards within one’s social condition, which is precisely what Bartky describes as 
feminist consciousness. I suspect that the conflict arises within feminist consciousness 
when one becomes also aware that many socially acceptable practices are not morally 
acceptable.  
In an article on moral responsibility, Cheshire Calhoun draws a notable distinction 
between what she calls normal moral contexts, and abnormal moral contexts.58 In a 
normal moral context, it is a rare exception that a member of a social community be 
unaware of any given social norm within that community; the relevant standards are well 
distributed throughout the community. In an abnormal moral context, there is some 
relevant standard that is not distributed throughout the community, and thus to be 
unaware of the particular standard or standards is the norm in that community.59 I think 
that this distinction is useful in locating the conflicting predicament that one may find 
oneself in when coming into feminist consciousness. Feminist consciousness entails 
being aware that social standards are sometimes oppressing, and people continue to 
accept and perpetuate them. Given such an awareness, feminist consciousness finds itself 
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caught in-between two sorts of standards: the socially accepted standard, and the 
possibility of a morally acceptable standard in its place. I suggest that feminist 
consciousness is the realization of being in an abnormal moral context; those who have 
acquired a feminist consciousness are in an epistemic minority. That is, their awareness 
of a morally acceptable standard among genders is not the norm in their society. My 
suggestion is that an authentic feminist will take up the project of shifting an abnormal 
moral context into a normal one, where the possibility of gender equality is realized and 
the social norms reflect this equality. What then is the difference between the inauthentic 
feminist and the authentic feminist? 
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CHAPTER 10 
THE INAUTHENTIC FEMINIST 
 While I take feminist consciousness to be necessary in becoming authentically 
feminist, bad faith is still possible within a mode of feminist consciousness. To not take 
up the project of exercising one’s freedom in the face of oppression is to be 
inauthentically aware. Take an example: if Alice has recently come into a feminist 
conscious awareness of her oppression as a woman, she may still fail to take seriously her 
possibilities. She may fail to act upon the idea that things could be otherwise. Alice could 
deceive herself into a mode of being caught in a patriarchal web of constraints just as a 
candle wick is caught in a block of wax until it burns out. She submits to her thrown 
condition and allows her oppression to shape and restrain her being. We may even 
suppose that Alice consistently complains about her oppression; she says things like, 
“why do I have to paint my face every single day in order to make myself presentable?” 
But Alice applies her makeup each morning before work, prepares meals for her children 
before school while her husband reads the newspaper, and comes home to cook supper 
and clean the kitchen while her husband watches baseball. All the while, she complains 
as though she wishes things to be different. Still, she does nothing different, she does not 
take up different possibilities; she rejects her own freedom to choose. She falls prey to 
her social condition, and deceives herself into the mode of the in-itself.  
Alice, despite having gained a feminist consciousness, is in bad faith in that she 
takes her existence and her role in the patriarchy as a given. She does not accept 
responsibility for her choosing to play that role, nor does she accept her freedom to 
choose otherwise. Further, recall Heidegger’s conception of falling prey; Alice has fallen 
46 
 
prey to the social norms and roles given to her by patriarchal society. By all of the criteria 
we have highlighted above, Alice is inauthentic in regard to feminist being. Alice seeks to 
escape her own role in condition which she knows herself to be in. She fails to take 
responsibility for her continued involvement in her oppressed state of being. We have 
hereby answered our first question: Alice is the inauthentic feminist.  
 One might of course ask, what makes Alice a feminist at all? In a certain sense, 
she is a feminist in that she is thinking feminist thoughts. She discusses cases of unjust 
treatment between genders. Most importantly, she is aware of her oppressive condition 
and unsatisfied with the way things are. I am claiming that Alice has reached a state of 
feminist consciousness. She is differently aware of things that she once took as merely 
being the way things are. I will argue that feminist being requires feminist authenticity. If 
Alice, who has become conscious of her oppressed condition and who recognizes and 
opposes (in thought or in attitude) her condition is not a feminist, then it is because she is 
not authentically feminist. To be clear, it is not wholly important whether Alice is or is 
not a feminist, what is important, is that she is not an authentic feminist. In order to be an 
authentic feminist, Alice must take up responsibility for her freedom and the freedom of 
human beings (full stop). She must choose among her newly found possibilities (e.g. to 
not apply make up every day… or at all), and to be something other than what social 
patriarchy (the they) dictates that she be. She ought to be what she authentically chooses 
to be and embrace her existence as freedom. Instead, Alice hides behind her bad faith. 
Note that I am not claiming that make-up entails inauthenticity, rather Alice should 
embrace her freedom to not wear make-up in the case that she prefers a world in which 
she need not wear make-up.  
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Working backwards as Sartre has done with bad faith and authenticity, we can 
now frame the picture of the authentic feminist in contrast to Alice. The authentic 
feminist will take up her possibilities upon gaining a feminist consciousness. To use 
another example, suppose that Carol finds herself caught on the outskirts of patriarchal 
social context; she has become aware that her being oppressed is restricting her 
possibilities. Oppression threatens to confine her to a mode of being in-itself. Carol 
realizes that all along she has been acting and being according to what society dictates 
that she be, despite her existence as freedom. Carol, like Alice, has gained feminist 
consciousness.  
Carol finds herself complaining about makeup and housework before and after 
work. Unlike Alice, Carol decides to wean herself off of makeup, and she plans a 
discussion with her husband about an even distribution of household upkeep and parental 
duties. Carol takes up her own possibilities which are not merely or at all the roles which 
society gives her. Carol moves to uproot such roles by defying those constraining barriers 
that she can. Carol further encourages others to become aware and responsible for their 
freedom, for this fosters the possibilities that feminist consciousness is aware of and 
ultimately fosters freedom; in this I adopt Vogel’s view; Vogel claims that part of being 
authentic da-sein is to take up some extent of responsibility to others’ freedom as well as 
to one’s own freedom.60 Further, we have seen in De Beauvoir that a true existential 
approach will carry with it the underlying goal of freedom for humanity. While it is not 
up to Carol to force others into a mode of accepting their own freedom and taking up 
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their own possibilities, part of feminist movement is to bring about a change in social 
context (i.e., a shift from an abnormal moral context to a normal one).  
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CHAPTER 11 
THE AUTHENTIC OPPRESSOR? 
Now that we have in mind a conception of an authentic feminist, it may still be 
worrisome that it is possible under our criteria that there also be an authentic oppressor. 
This is a troubling possibility as it would undermine any measure of value that we might 
expect a conception of authenticity to hold. Let us recount our criteria: the authentic 
agent accepts her existence as freedom, thereby accepting her existence as possibility and 
as being responsible for her freedom. The agent does not attempt to deceive herself about 
the nature of her condition, that is, she does not feign her existence as one of a given 
essence. She does not accept her place in society as lacking other possibilities. Finally, 
we have learned from De Beauvoir that that existentialism contains a content relevant 
value, and that value is freedom. It will then be important to keep in mind that this project 
is a case for a specific, existential conception of authenticity. The worry then, is that an 
oppressor can accept his existence as freedom, not be in bad faith about his place within 
the patriarchy, and not take his place within the patriarchy as a given fact about his being 
male. While it seems likely that most oppressors in fact are in bad faith to varying 
degrees, the possibility of the authentic oppressor is pressing.  
The abnormal moral context of a patriarchy (abnormal from the perspective of the 
feminist) is full of “socially acceptable” oppressors. As Calhoun points out in her essay, 
many or perhaps most of these oppressors are everyday men, “the ‘villains’ are ordinary 
men, with ordinary characters, living out ordinary lives as husbands, scientists, ad 
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men…”61 These men are in other respects, upstanding citizens of the community. 
Suppose however that there is a villainous oppressor. This oppressor is not a rapist or a 
murderer, he is a man with a typical character, and a typical job. Let us suppose that this 
oppressor is Philip. Perhaps Philip works with Carol. Everyday Philip comes into work, 
he shakes Jim’s hand, gives Carol a hug, and compliments her dress. One day Philip 
comes in, shakes Jim’s hand, turns to Carol and she puts out her hand as in invitation to 
shake. Philip becomes offended, and Carol explains to him that she prefers to be treated 
as a friendly business partner just as Jim is treated. Throughout the next few weeks, 
Philip notices that Carol has not been wearing makeup, and she often comes into the 
office in slacks and a button-down shirt. During lunch over these few weeks Carol points 
out various oppressive social practices and patriarchal standards/roles.  
Suppose that Philip gains a feminist consciousness from his enlightening 
discussions with Carol. Philip realizes that his whole life he has been benefiting from 
patriarchal society at the detriment of women’s freedom. Philip becomes aware that some 
of his own behaviors have been oppressive. But rather than considering his alternative 
ways of being toward others, he embraces his privileged role within the patriarchy. Philip 
decides that he likes reaping the benefits of his being a male in a male dominating 
society. If we suppose that Philip is not in bad faith about his possibilities of becoming 
other than an oppressor in his patriarchal context, then is he an authentic oppressor? I do 
not think that he is.  
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First, I think that it is all too likely that his choosing to be an oppressor is 
contradictory to some other value or values that he holds, which would put him in a form 
of bad faith. If this is the case, then he is not wholly authentic in regard to his 
oppressiveness. Second, by embracing the role of an oppressor in a patriarchal context, he 
chooses to be a sincere oppressor. Sincerity for Sartre is a particular form of bad faith. 
Sincerity is a form of admitting to oneself what one is but still denying what one is not 
and thus what one could be.62 But a human being, whose existence is freedom, can never 
be what they are. This is because human beings are always freedom, they always choose 
and are never a given.63 Philip admits to himself that he is an oppressor and embraces this 
role. But in choosing to remain an oppressor, Philip escapes a wide sense of being in bad 
faith, but condemns himself to a mode of mere sincerity which is not authenticity.  
At this point, the importance of the content of one’s values and projects becomes 
most relevant to determining authenticity. Let me explain how values can play a role in 
the existential picture that we have outlined so far. Recall that bad faith is a form of lying 
to oneself about the very nature of one’s being. Ronald Santoni correctly points out a 
particular difficulty in Sartre’s theory of bad faith. The difficulty lies in Sartre’s 
phenomenology of consciousness, where consciousness is transparent to itself. That is, 
for Sartre there exists no double consciousness or otherwise put, sub-consciousness. If 
this is the case, then it seems quite impossible for a person to wholly conceal anything 
from oneself, as bad faith threatens to do. While Sartre is well aware of this difficulty in 
his depiction of bad faith as a lie to oneself, his response to the problem is anything but 
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clear. Sartre says that bad faith hides from itself by not believing what one believes. He 
further says, “bad faith does not succeed in believing what it wishes to believe”.64 Bad 
faith must then persuade itself to believe something that it does not believe. Santoni 
clarifies bad faith as being the acceptance of insufficient evidence, 
Because faith is not certainty, the consciousness of bad faith (or, “bad-faith 
consciousness”) decides to be content with an insufficiency of evidence; to determine 
arbitrarily the amount of evidence by which it will be persuaded, while “knowing” that 
the amount it requires is not sufficient to persuade fully.65 
 
Bad faith thus only succeeds in deceiving itself insofar as it chooses to believe a thing 
about itself which it does not wholly accept. My point is that Philip can only authentically 
be an oppressor if his acceptance of being an oppressor does not involve his concealing 
any evidence to the contrary. Thus, understanding his existence as freedom and exerting 
that freedom against the freedom of others is something of a contradiction. He is in some 
manor denying existence as freedom. As such, Philip’s lack of authenticity is very much 
comparable to De Beauvoir’s example of the adventurer. The adventurer too, seems to be 
in a state of mere sincerity. Despite embracing his freedom to choose, he takes too 
seriously the conditions and practices of the patriarchy and falls prey to those given 
schemes. In this way, Philip does not genuinely embrace existence as freedom and all 
things as possibility. 
If for example, Phil authentically (without accepting insufficient evidence for his 
belief) believes that he is in excellent physical condition, he cannot also authentically 
                                                 
64 Sartre, BN, 115. 
 
65 Ronald Santoni, “Bad Faith and Lying to Oneself” in Bad Faith, Good Faith, and Authenticity in Sartre’s 
Early Philosophy, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995), 38-39. 
 
53 
 
believe his doctor when his doctor informs him that his blood pressure and cholesterol 
levels are too high. In order for Phil to be authentic in regard to his beliefs about his 
health and well-being, he must adjust one or the other of his beliefs in respect to a 
sufficient amount of supporting evidence and not take as an absolute his evidence for his 
physical health. Philip’s physical health is not an absolute, and his choices may effect it.  
If Philip attempts to conceal from himself the evidence contrary to his belief that he is in 
excellent physical health, then he is in bad faith about his belief just as Phil in other cases 
which we have discussed is in bad faith about being condemned to eat burnt cookies or 
factically being an office manager. Likewise, if Philip authentically believes himself to be 
an oppressor, then he must not conceal from himself any evidence to the contrary. 
 My point is twofold: first, it is highly unlikely that a state of being an oppressor 
does not conflict with some authentically held value or another, such as the belief that a 
job well done deserves a fair rate of pay, second, and most importantly, the any oppressor 
who may even be questionably authentic in his projects and values, must value freedom. 
However, in the case that the oppressor does value freedom, she or he must be resisting 
evidence of existence generally as freedom for others. This point may seem like a reach, 
but it is not unfamiliar to the way that feminists often talk about sexism. It is no secret 
that sexist standards tend to take on a certain hypocritical or contradictory form.66 
Perhaps the most obvious example of such a contradictory standard is the case in which a 
man is paid more than a woman for the same work position. My point is ultimately that, 
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to be an oppressor is almost inevitably to be in conflict with some value(s) or belief(s) 
that one holds, and thus one must be in bad faith about some belief in regard to 
authenticity on the matter. In this event, the agent is not authentic, though he or she may 
be sincere in their beliefs.  
Even if we suppose that the oppressor does not hold any conflicting values which 
he conceals from himself in regard to his being an oppressor, he can only be sincerely so. 
Sincerity for Sartre does not conform to a common usage of the word. Since Sartre 
describes sincerity as a form of bad faith, sincerity serves as a denial of one’s existence as 
freedom. Further, both modes of inauthenticity (bad faith and sincerity) confuse one’s 
existence as being in-itself rather than for-itself. The difference lies in the free intention 
of the sincere agent; the sincere agent freely chooses to claim a mode of the in-itself, 
where the bad faith agent mistakes the mode of the in-itself as a given. Sartre’s waiter is 
in bad faith because he takes his existence as a waiter as a given and therefore ignores 
alternative possibilities. Phil the oppressor acknowledges his freedom as well as his 
choices and freely assumes the role of the in-itself. The waiter does not admit to himself 
his free choice to be a waiter as the sincere oppressor admits of his choosing to be an 
oppressor. Still the oppressor is in bad faith because he resigns his freedom in favor of 
being merely what he is (an oppressor) without embracing his freedom as for-himself. A 
person, whose existence is freedom, cannot ever exist as being what it is. The oppressor 
cannot be an oppressor as the coffee pot is a coffee pot.  
The most condemning evidence against the sincere oppressor, is that his values 
and projects wholly undermine freedom, which is existentially the most fundamental 
value of all authentic projects.  
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It could be likewise objected that the feminist cannot be a feminist as the coffee 
pot is a coffee pot. My response to this is that the oppressor cannot embrace freedom as 
the feminist embraces freedom (recall Fry’s definition of oppression). The authentic 
feminist, contrary to the sincere oppressor and the inauthentic feminist, embraces 
freedom as existence in that she carries out a project which promotes freedom rather than 
constrains or limits it to the being of the in-itself. The authentic feminist’s project is 
necessarily to be for-itself, since it seeks to broaden its possibilities and to embrace 
existence as freedom. The oppressor does no such thing whether sincere about his actions 
or not, as an oppressor and certainly as being an oppressor, freedom is avoided or 
otherwise denied which is to be in bad faith.  
It is worth mentioning that my interpretation of Sartre on sincerity is not 
uncontroversial. Some Sartrean scholars have located a problem of equivocation between 
his notions of bad faith and sincerity. Joseph Catalano takes a more forgiving 
interpretation (as I have done above) though he only treats the point in a footnote.67 
Ronald Santoni has argued that sincerity must be a form of authenticity rather than a form 
of bad faith.68 While I think that Sartre’s text does arguably back up my own 
interpretation, as Sartre himself explicitly says that sincerity is a form of bad faith,that 
argument cannot be shown here.  For now, suffice it to say, if we as human beings are 
never merely what we are (as a paperknife is merely a paperknife), then any claim to be 
that thing (full stop) is a claim born from bad faith. What distinguishes bad faith from 
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sincerity is the amount of evidence which grounds the relevant belief in question. In the 
case of bad faith, as we have discussed, the evidence is insufficient for authentically 
holding the belief. On the other hand, in the case of sincerity, the evidence is well 
grounded by choices and actions, yet still intentionally avoids freedom and possibility for 
being what one is not and not being what one is and further from De Beauvoir we can see 
that freedom must be the end game as well.  
Finally, one might ask about the “innocent” oppressor who means well, but 
nevertheless conducts oppressive behaviors. I think that this case is more easily handled 
than the Philip oppressor case above, but certainly a more commonly found, concrete 
example which makes it pressing in and of itself. The innocent oppressor must be in bad 
faith, in regard to his oppressiveness. The innocent oppressor does not see his behavior 
for what it is. This is certainly true of most any oppressor in the case that the oppressor 
exists in an abnormal moral context where only those with a feminist consciousness are 
aware of certain oppressive norms. If he becomes aware of what his behavior is, then he 
may enter a phase of sincerity or possibly even feminist consciousness, but he must take 
up his own project in accord with freedom and newly informed values in order to achieve 
feminist authenticity.  
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CHAPTER 12 
CONCLUSION 
The aim of this project is to establish a working definition of feminist 
authenticity. Given this existentialist definition, I have argued for a response to the two 
questions stated in the opening paragraph. First, I have identified an example of what an 
inauthentic feminist might look like. Second, I have argued that neither the self-appointed 
oppressor, nor the “innocent” oppressor is authentic regarding a feminist domain of 
authenticity. The authentic feminist has gained a feminist consciousness and embraces 
existence as freedom. Given these two things, she takes up the project of promoting the 
freedom and possibilities of people in general. This project is not a project regarding the 
discovery of who one truly is (since a person’s existence precedes their essence), it is a 
project of enacting one’s freedom within society for the betterment of human possibility.  
The resulting definition of feminist authenticity is first and foremost existentialist. 
The existentialist conception is capable of capturing the social nature of human existence 
and human projects. Since existentialism contains the fundamental theme of human 
existence as freedom, we learn from De Beauvoir that the moral content of existentialist 
concepts must be founded upon the goal of freedom. Thus, I have argued that certain 
feminist projects are authentic since they are founded upon the goal of freedom (against 
the oppression of freedom). Feminist authenticity entails the responsibility for choosing 
freedom as its end. Note that there may be many different cases of inauthentic feminist 
projects such as any radical movements which in any way seek to restrain the freedom of 
others. Finally, I hope that this project may bring light to the possibilities of many other 
types of authentic projects.  
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